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“GIVE US WORD OF THE HUMANKIND WE LEFT TO THEE:” GLOBALIZATION AND ITS WAKE¹

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About the Author

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Introduction

As the 19th century closed, the Spirits of the Dead Centuries gathered on their granite thrones, as was their centennial habit. There, in the vaulted chamber of the Past, the Spirit of the Eighteenth Century requested the mandated report: "Tell thy tale, brother. Give us word of the humankind we left to thee."² "I am the Spirit of the Wonderful Century," the Spirit of the Nineteenth Century began.³

So opens a chapter in Walter Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, published a century ago (1907). Rauschenbusch's imagination was privileged to attend the meeting of the Spirits. The Spirit of the Nineteenth Century—the Wonderful Century—continued.

I gave men mastery over nature.
Discoveries and inventions, which
lighted the black space of the past
like lovely stars, have clustered in the
Milky Way of radiance under my rule.
One man does by the touch of his hand
what the toil of a thousand slaves never
did. Knowledge has unlocked the
mines of wealth, and the hoarded
wealth of to-day creates the vaster
wealth of to-morrow. Man has escaped
the slavery of Necessity and is free. I
freed the thoughts of men. They face

the facts and know their knowledge is common to all. The deeds of the East at even are known in the West at morn. They send their whispers under the seas and across the clouds.

I broke the chains of bigotry and despotism. I made men free and equal. Every man feels the worth of his manhood.

I have touched the summit of history. I did for mankind what none of you did before. They are rich. They are wise. They are free.⁴

The Spirits sit in silence for awhile, "with troubled eyes." Eventually the Spirit of the First Century speaks. The First Century asks searing questions about Nineteenth Century claims that "You have made men rich. . . You have made men wise. . . You have set them free. . . You have made them one."⁵ The Nineteenth Century listens, its head sinks to its breast and the Spirit says:

Your shame is already upon me. My great cities are as yours were. My millions live from hand to mouth. Those who toil longest have the least. My thousands sink exhausted before their days are half spent. My human wreckage multiplies. Class faces class in sullen distrust. Their freedom and knowledge has only made men keener to suffer.⁶

Now with troubled eyes of its own, the Nineteenth Century Spirit can only issue a request: "Give me a seat among you, and let me think why it has been so."⁷

Rauschenbusch is now long gone, so it is ours is to ask what the Spirit of the *Twentieth* Century will testify, and what searing questions will be asked. No doubt we, too,

will have to "think why it has been so."

This *EDS Occasional Paper* is an effort to do that. It first asks what the Twentieth Century report would add to that of the Nineteenth, then interrogates the history that helps explain both the Nineteenth and Twentieth. That history, described here as three waves of globalization, includes the workings of Euro-American Christianity as a major force. The discussion will thus conclude with reflection on the kind of ecclesial work most needed for the foreseeable future.

Joined Questions

The Nineteenth Century raised what Rauschenbusch, together with other reform-minded clergy, academic students of society, and popular worker movements came to identify as "the social question," "the social problem," or "the modern social problem." The phrases themselves are Ernst Troeltsch's. His own rendition of "the social problem" is found in an opus that trails Rauschenbusch's only a few years (1911).

This social problem is vast and complicated. It includes the problem of the capitalist economic period and of the industrial proletariat created by it; and of the growth of militaristic and bureaucratic giant states; of the enormous increase in population, which affects colonial and world policy, of the mechanical technique, which produces enormous masses of materials and links up and mobilizes the whole world for purposes of trade, but which also treats men and labour like machines.⁸

By whatever account, "the social question" or

“the modern social problem” was the effort to name the exploitative character and dislocating effects of rapidly developing industrial society. Its driving force was the economy Adam Smith studied. “Capitalism”⁹ was not yet its name when Smith penned *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, but its engine—the robust ways of the emerging bourgeoisie—was already esteemed. Marx himself was awed.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraph, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?¹⁰

Marx proved spectacularly wrong in his prophecy that the proletariat would become the gravediggers of the bourgeoisie and that the coming socialist revolution would upend global capitalism itself. But he was right, as were Troeltsch and Rauschenbusch, about the atomization of society and the exploitative, alienating character of industrialized orders. And had all three been present in the year 2000 for the report of the Spirit of the Twentieth Century, they would likely not have been surprised that “the social question” persists, only now in genuinely global dimensions. The assault on settled community still defines our world, as does class suffering, compounded with racial, gender, religious, and

ethnic elements. While the gap between rich and poor widens, institutions of family, community, and nation-state still struggle to stave off the atomization of society amidst shifting identities and unsure sovereignty.

But does the Spirit of the Twentieth Century report anything else? Yes, and it went largely unnoticed by Rauschenbusch, Marx, and Troeltsch. In the final third of the 20th century, “the ecological question” joins “the social question.” The slow degradation of Earth’s life-forms and life-systems threatens the Community of Life wherever it is found—in the air, on the land, under the mighty sea. The causes are multiple and complex, but like the social question the ecological question, too, is primarily the downside of the organization and habits of modern society. It manifests itself as the unending transformation of nature—a parallel to the unending transformation of society. More specifically, it manifests itself now as shrinking habitat and disappearing species, eroding soils, altered plant gene pools, monocropping and industrialized agriculture, collapsing fisheries, fouled air, environment-related disease, receding forests, and climate instability. It, too, has gone genuinely global and, together with the social question, largely defines our world.

But what explains their shared genes? What history is common to both the social and the ecological questions? “Globalization” is a homely, if not ugly, word. But it is a handy tag, imbedded as it is in much rhetoric, and it can explain much, provided it is described in successive waves that reach back to Smith and Marx and well before.

Globalization

Colonization. Colonization, with conquest, commerce, Christianity, and

European-based civilization the essential elements, is the first great wave. Columbus and his rustic crew, unloading supplies in Cadiz in 1492 for what turned out to be an epoch-making voyage, serve as a convenient symbol. Geographer Martin Behaim and his apprentices, fabricating the first globe in Nuremburg in the same year, could stand in as well. On 17 April Columbus was granted the privileges of "discovery and conquest" by Queen Isabel and King Ferdinand of Spain. On 4 May of the next year Pope Alexander VI's "Bull of Donation" granted *all* lands, whether islands or mainlands, "discovered and to be discovered, one hundred leagues to the West and South of the Azores toward India" and not already claimed by any other Christian nobility as of Christmas of 1492, to these Catholic monarchs.¹¹

It was a Papal Bull more extraordinary than most. The Holy Father simply "donated" to Columbus's sponsors the peoples and lands not yet colonized by Christian monarchs. Christian Europeans were to be rulers, plain and simple, of all nations, "wherever they might be found and whatever creed they might embrace," in Alexander's words.¹² It was in fact Christian Europe's humble duty, the Pope stipulated, to incorporate the "savages" into their occupier's rule for the sake of their immortal, but lost, souls.

In plainer English: when Columbus sailed from Cadiz, theft was his religious right and conquest his Christian duty, necessary for the safe deliverance of the colonized themselves.¹³

But the point is not chiefly a moral one, at least at this juncture. It is historical: those colonized in the manner of what soon became neo-European settlements around the globe were cultures *and nature* together. Far-flung peoples, their ways of life and their lands, flora

and fauna, soils and seeds, were transformed together and as part of the same process. Yes, influences flowed both ways in the contact between newcomers and indigenous. Crops and knowledge and eventually peoples went to Europe that no Europeans knew.¹⁴ But overall the transformations were wildly one-sided in favor of forces that created modernity in a European mode.

Few have described this as vividly as Alfred Crosby in *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*. Crosby uses the charming American folk tune, "Sweet Betsy from Pike," to capture the "world-altering avalanche" of the first wave of genuine globalization. What has to be explained, he says, is why "European emigrants and their descendants are all over the place."¹⁵ Accounting for the other subdivisions of *homo sapiens* is much easier. Virtually all Amerindians live in the Americas, Inuit in the polar lands, Melansians, Polynesians, and Micronesians across the watery continent of the Pacific. Black Africans live on three continents, to be sure, but it is because diaspora was forced upon them. And even at that they still largely live in their original latitudes, facing one another across the same ocean. With notable exceptions, even most varieties of Asians live in Asia, and certainly did so until the latter half of the present century.¹⁶ But not so peoples of European stock. The highest population growth rates in history are not those of Asians, Latin Americans, or Africans, but Europeans in the period 1750-1930. Caucasians increased over 5 times in this period, compared with a 2.3 increase for Asians and less than a doubling for Africans. Even in the latter half of this time span, from 1840-1930, the European population at home on the continent was still

double the rate of increase of the rest of the globe, while in the “neo-Europes” (the places Europeans settled in leapfrogging around the world), the population of Europeans and their descendants increased more than 14 times over! This latter phenomenon flowed from the highest rates of emigration in history, with the deluge occurring between 1820-1930. More than fifty million Europeans migrated to the neo-Europes, a number one-fifth of the entire European population at the beginning of the century.¹⁷ Resettled Caucasians in fact secured thirty million square kilometers of land around the globe, one of the “very greatest aberrations in the demographic history of the species,”¹⁸ but evidently considered a permanent arrangement by this minority. In any event, they entertained few qualms about it, thanks perhaps in part to the Pope and his bull.

European globalization in this aggressive white and Western way did not happen, Crosby says, because Europeans were genetically more expansionist than other peoples, or more warrior-like by disposition, but because they first learned to master the great ocean currents of the Atlantic and Pacific in ships sizeable enough to bear sufficient cargo for a long and profitable journey. This effectively stitched shut the seams of Pangaea, that great land mass of Earth huddled together before the continents rode on tectonic plates to new places. Since nature itself had evolved differently, even at the same latitudes and climes, on these now-parted continents, the neo-European contact was dramatic for the whole Community of Life. In Crosby’s vivid picture:

The seams of Pangaea were closing, drawn together by the sailmaker’s needle. Chickens met kiwis, cattle met kangaroos, Irish met potatoes,

Comanches met horses, Incas met smallpox—all for the first time. The countdown to the extinction of the passenger pigeon and the native peoples of the Greater Antilles and of Tasmania had begun. A vast expansion in the numbers of certain other species on this planet began, led off by pigs and cattle, by certain weeds and pathogens, and by the Old World peoples who first benefited from contact with lands on the other side of the seams of Pangaea.¹⁹

To say it differently: “Iowa” isn’t a Norwegian word, nor “Des Moines, Iowa” the name of an aboriginal place. Neither are “Johannesburg, South Africa,” “Melbourne, Australia,” “Christchurch, New Zealand,” “Colombo, Sri Lanka,” or “Sao Paulo, Brazil” aboriginal names and places. Corn and potatoes aren’t crops any Norwegian knew, much less grew, before emigrating to Iowa.

Enter “Sweet Betsy from Pike,” Crosby’s icon for this convulsive, simultaneous upending of nature and culture. Miss Betsy was from Pike County, Missouri, and she crossed the high mountains, the Rockies, with her lover, Ike. But not only Ike. Along were—so the song goes—“two yoke of oxen, a large yellow dog, a tall Shanghai rooster, and one spotted hog.” Here is Crosby’s account.

Betsy was heir to a very old tradition of mixed farming, and whereas it must be pointed out that her oxen were castrated and the other animals without mates, Betsy’s party was not the only one to cross the mountains; wagon trains had bulls and cows, plus hens and dogs and pigs of genders opposite to those of her animals.

(Betsy herself had the foresight to bring Ike.) Rapid propagation of the colonizing species would be the rule on the far side of the mountain. Betsy came not as an individual immigrant but as part of a grunting, lowing, neighing, crowing, chirping, snarling, buzzing, self-replicating and world-altering avalanche.²⁰

This, then, is the first wave of globalization: a “self-replicating and world-altering avalanche” that slid outward from Europe and upended culture and nature together on all continents save Antarctica. In one sense, there is little new here, since human beings have always traded secrets and tools and moved in on their neighbors and their land. They have, to recall Crosby’s title, regularly committed social and ecological “imperialism” and engaged in “biological expansion.” Yet never on the planetary scale made possible by the needles and ships of European sailors, never as a matter of genuine globalization.

The effects of this “self-replicating and world-altering avalanche” did not go unnoticed. It was noticed—and resisted—first and foremost, of course, by those on the receiving end—the peoples in the places given new names, languages, religion, cultures, diseases, and crops. But it was also noted by the very Europeans confident of their cause and convinced of their mission. Crosby includes telling epigraphs from four famous authors, all penned a century-and-a-half and more ago and within seventy-five years of one another.

The first is from Adam Smith in *Wealth of Nations*. Writing in 1776, Smith said with remarkable confidence that “[t]he discovery

of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind.”²¹ Little more than a half-century later, Charles Darwin, in *The Voyage of the Beagle* (1839), noted that “[w]herever the European had trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal. We may look to the wide extent of the Americas, Polynesia, the Cape of Good Hope, and Australia, and we find the same result.” And only nine years after Darwin, Karl Marx included this in the manifesto of 1848 we met earlier: “The discovery of America, [and] the rounding of the Cape opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.” Crosby’s fourth citation is from Charles Lyell, a contemporary of Darwin and Marx. Lyell, assessing the process of European-led transformation of nature and culture together, says in his *Principles of Geology* of 1832: “Yet, if we wield the sword of extermination as we advance, we have no reason to repine the havoc committed.”²² (Near the beginning of this century, Theodore Roosevelt said much the same with much the same assurance, in *The Winning of the West*: “The settler and the pioneer have at bottom had justice on their side. This great continent could not have been kept as nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages.”)²³

Intriguing, is it not, that a moral philosopher tracking what then was the new economy, a biologist describing natural

selection and developing evolution as a theory, a social historian and critical student of industrial capitalism, and a geologist, none of whom is reading the other, should all mention the discovery of America and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope as turbulent, epoch-making events? Even more intriguing are the historical connections of the “most important events recorded in the history of mankind” (Smith) to the revolutionary change and development of European society (Marx) and then both of these to the death of aboriginal peoples and their societies and cultures around the world (Darwin), complete with testimony to the justice of this rapaciousness (Lyell). And all these are recorded, not in 1992 with a 500-year gaze backward to Columbus sailing from Cadiz, or on the occasion of the quincentenary of the Bull of Donation, but independently of one another within three-quarters of a century beginning with 1776.

This suggests a coherence. It may be the coherence tagged by Sallie McFague “the arrogant eye.”²⁴ The arrogant eye is a perspective on both human and other-than-human worlds that assumes nobility and superiority on the part of the viewer and that views the other in relation to a controlling center which the viewer occupies. Such is represented by another famous scholar and contemporary of Adam Smith, Robert Boyle. But Boyle was not only the famous scientist,²⁵ he was also governor of the New England Company in the 1760s. The mechanistic science and philosophy arising in the British Isles and Europe that would, following Newton, Descartes and others, render everything as “object” to the human mind as “subject” was Boyle’s as well. And like others, he saw it as an instrument of power both over nature and over the native inhabitants of “new” England. They

erroneously venerated nature “as a kind of goddess,” he complained, and this veneration “has been a discouraging impediment to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God.”²⁶ “The empire of man,” Vandana Shiva remarks, here takes the place of any notion of any “earth family”²⁷ in which humans are all part of a more comprehensive Community of Life. But of course it is not truly “the empire of man,” either, for Boyle or his compatriots. It is the empire of the colonizing peoples and their cultures. Diversity of either peoples, cultures, or the rest of nature wasn’t up for consideration by a worldview that took European men and their ways as the norm of being human. Indeed, the same Darwin who observed what wherever Europeans trod aboriginal deaths followed was also possessed of “the arrogant eye.” Convinced as he was of “lower and higher races of man,” he was also quite sure that the process of competitive struggle by which the fit survive meant a future in which “the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races throughout the world.”²⁸ Such is life.

But maybe John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony twelve times following his selection in 1629, was clearest of all, a full century or two before our other witnesses. Complaining that indigenous peoples did not “improve” their lands, he justified remedial action on the part of Bay colonists:

Natives in New England, they enclose no land, neither have they any settled habitation, nor any tame cattle to improve the land by....Soe as if we leave them sufficient for their use, we may lawfully take the rest.²⁹

Crosby’s own remark about the arrogant coherence that reaches across all these

testimonies implicates the religion that saw itself part of European civilizational superiority and is chilling and true:

Again and again, during the centuries of European imperialism, the Christian view that all men are brothers was to lead to persecution of non-Europeans—he who is my brother sins to the extent that he is unlike me.³⁰

Yet another account considers this first and formative wave of globalization a record of more than now-Dead Centuries and their Spirits. This one is from a letter to the editor of *Perfil de la Jornada*, Mexico City, 27 January 1994. The date is important. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect at midnight, 1 January of that year. That very day, and by design, a hitherto unknown movement emerged from the forests of the state of Chiapas to challenge the Mexican government. But it intended to challenge more than the government. It intended to challenge the whole process by which Earth is unified—i.e., globalized. Subcommandante Marcos, leader of the Zapatistas, begins his letter as follows:

Suppose you want to travel to the South East of the country, and suppose you find yourself on one of the three roads which lead to the state of Chiapas....Our wealth leaves this land not just on these three roads. Chiapas is bleeding to death in a thousand ways: through oil and gas pipelines, power supply lines, railway cars, banking accounts, trucks, ships and airplanes, clandestine paths and paved roads. This land continues to pay its tribute to the empire: oil,

electricity, cattle, coffee, maize, honey, tobacco....Primary resources, several billion tons with various destinations, flow out to...the USA, Canada, Holland, Germany, Italy, Japan, but always with the same destination: the empire.³¹

“The empire.” This is how the first wave of globalization—conquest, colonization, commerce, Christianity, and the spread of European-based civilization—was experienced by recipients and settlers alike. For the empire, “my brother sins to the extent he is unlike me.” But “the empire” is also how the land experienced globalization. Its product was no longer intended for local use only nor was it returned to the place of origin to recycle as part of the endowment there. In a word, nature was colonized together with peoples and in the process it changed. It changed—above all in the minds and practices of the colonizers—from a self-organizing, living system all humans are inextricably part of to raw material available to human manipulation and in need of management and control.³² “Wild” nature needed “taming,” as did native peoples, so that their proper telos as “natural and human resources” for a world in accord with human design and stewardship might be accomplished (i.e., the colonizers’ design and stewardship). In a word: in the first wave of globalization, nature and culture were both mightily transformed—globally transformed—together. And they were transformed both materially *and conceptually*. Part of the conceptual transformation was in fact to rend culture from nature. Pre-modern cosmologies—those met in the settling of neo-Europes around the globe, for example—tended to understand nature as culture and biota together. Nature was both “first nature” (biotic communities)

and “second nature” (culture as the human transformation of first nature in a given locale). Or, said somewhat differently, nature was the comprehensive Community of Life in its ongoing life. But globalization’s initial wave carried with it developing dualisms and hierarchies that sharply distinguished nature and culture, nature and history, nature and society, and considered the first of each pair the stage and resources for the latter. Yet the rendering was not complete. Within the dualisms and hierarchies the peoples and cultures of the New World were actually conceived as belonging to “nature” itself, or, since they were obviously of the same species as the colonizers, as at least “closer to nature” and thus inferior. So it transpired that indigenous cultures could be subjected to the same kind of conquest and lack of rights visited upon nature. (The patriarchal lens of “the arrogant eye” assigned a similar place to women generally—closer to nature—while at the same time nuancing hierarchy so as to privilege Caucasian women, since they belonged to a culture qualitatively superior.) Given worldviews as incommensurate as these—the arrogant eye of a version of apartheid thinking³³ and nature as comprehensive of the whole Community of Life—no genuine exchange or reciprocity was possible. Serious conflicts would of necessity be settled by force or its threat. And here, too, the “balance” was one-sided.

Development. The citation from *Profil de la Jornada* is a latecomer to the drama just described and serves to move us from globalization’s first wave (colonization) to the second (development). The message from Chiapas was in fact a call, says Gustavo Esteva, for an end “to 500 years of oppression

and 40 years of development.”³⁴ An end to “40 years of development?” What’s behind *that* Indian demand?

“Development” once meant simply and generically “evolution from within.” It was “synonymous with evolution as self-organization,”³⁵ a process in the hands of those who were developing. Development was thus internally rather than externally guided. But since the end of World War II and a reconfigured world in which the United States was the single strongest power, “development” has taken on another meaning. The post-war turning point was announced by President Truman in his inaugural address of 1949. There he spoke of a “bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of *underdeveloped* areas.”³⁶ The criterion of development was stated clearly: “Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace,” and “the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.” “The United States,” he went on, “is preeminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques.”³⁷

Development thus came to mean, for Truman and “the West,” the way of life of capitalist democracies as defined by modern economic progress and advanced science and technology. In the words of Wolfgang Sachs: “The degree of civilization in a country could from now on be measured by its level of production. This new concept allowed the thousands of cultures to be separated unto the two simple categories of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped.’ (Or, as later modulated, ‘developed’ and ‘developing.’) Diverse societies were placed on a single progressive

track, more or less advancing according to the criteria of production.”³⁸ Thus it transpired, Sachs goes on, that on one winter day in 1949 on the Capitol steps, two-thirds of the planet’s space and two billion of its peoples became “underdeveloped” and in need of another way of living, whether they had considered themselves so or not.³⁹

Of course, from another slant there is little new in this notion of “development” other than the sharp departure from its earlier meaning of internally-directed evolution in keeping with a given locale and its conditions (the very meaning the Chiapas rebels held). This is essentially the long held European and neo-European assumption that (1) a higher level of material production built on a heightened capacity to alter the natural world for human benefit on a mass scale holds the key to progress; and (2) such progress is by definition in the interests of all peoples.⁴⁰ This is, in fact, the older tale of the arrival of civilization and salvation. But it is now cast in the secular language and ways of rising gross domestic product (GDP) and improved living standards.

There was another assumption: growth is a big, blockbuster “hit” with an unlimited run. Development could “be universalized in space” and rendered “durable in time.”⁴¹ It could be globalized and sustained, and should be.

Capitalist democratic and not-so-democratic versions were not alone in this. The Cold War, “East” and “West,” was in fact a sibling brouhaha, albeit of epochal proportions. Bureaucratic socialism, inclined also to the popular idiom of “democracies” and “republics,” shared all the basic assumptions of capitalist post-WWII “development”: industrial growth, capital

accumulation, consumerism as a life-style, and educational and technological prowess as key means. Bureaucratic socialism was effectively a kind of “state capitalism,” as many have remarked. The difference was not in the growth strategy itself or in viewing nature in terms of scarcity and technology in terms of abundance. Rather, the state, not private owners, promoted the growth mechanism and directed the economy as a command economy. Noted from another angle, the difference was not in the basic parameters and means of production and consumption but in distribution.⁴² At bottom, then, the warring parties of the Cold War agreed on development as the standard by which to measure all societies.

Conservative thinkers as well as liberal ones now acknowledge this. Edward Luttwak, a longtime fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, pleads for diversity. Current “turbo-capitalism,” he writes, “has much in common with the Soviet version of Communism. It too offers but a single model and a single set of rules for every country in the world, ignoring all differences of society, culture and temperament.”⁴³

In most quarters this notion has now suffered two blows, even though “growing the economy” is still the secular gospel sung with gusto. One is the crisis of nature—the rise of “the ecological question” in the latter decades of the 20th century. Earth’s finitude and biophysical limits bring “development” envisaged by Truman et alia, including the Soviets, up short in ways the first wave of globalization never bothered with, despite the damage. “The time of the finite world has come in which we are under house arrest,” UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the Earth Summit

in 1992, “nature no longer exists in the classic sense of the term.” “Progress in not necessarily compatible with life,” he added.⁴⁴

The crisis of nature is compounded by a crisis of social justice. Many are the dimensions, but the poverty and destitution of a socio-ecological class of one and one-half billion people as the 20th century draws to a close is the starkest of them. It is little consolation that the cruder model—bureaucratic socialism—proved an ecological disaster and was unable to supply cherished freedoms or pay its social justice bill. The more sophisticated and dynamic model of liberal capitalism has not yielded social justice, either. Nor does it yet know how to render “progress compatible with life” for the most basic economy of all—the economy of nature.

For both development models, East and West, the crisis of justice and the crisis of nature often stand in “an inverse relationship to each other,” as Sachs notes. “Any attempt to ease the crisis of justice threatens to aggravate the crisis of nature” and “any attempt to ease the crisis of nature threatens to aggravate the crisis of justice.”⁴⁵ Those demanding more agricultural land, energy, housing, and services in the interest of the poor often find themselves “in contradiction to those who would like to protect the soils, animals, forests, human health or the atmosphere.”⁴⁶ Those calling for less energy or transport, less clear-cutting and input-intensive agriculture for the sake of nature often find themselves up against those who insist on multiplying the fruits of progress. In a word, globalized development of the variety experienced in Chiapas before, and after, NAFTA does not and cannot satisfactorily address the concurrent crises of nature and justice. This is the reason the search of late

has been for a modified model of development. The answer, heralded at the Earth Summit,⁴⁷ has been “the comet-like rise of the concept of ‘sustainable development’.” Sustainable development promises—to cite Sachs again—“nothing less than to square the circle: to identify a type of development that promotes both ecological sustainability and international justice”⁴⁸ while integrating the world economy. Considering that humankind, here meaning essentially the global consumer classes, produced and consumed as many goods and services after 1950 as *the entire period of history before*,⁴⁹ and considering that the Brundtland Report itself estimates a five-to-tenfold increase needed in world industrial output before world population stabilizes in the next century, achieving both ecological sustainability and international justice is a daunting task!

Bill McKibben’s way of telling the story covers more than the decades of modern development or even the centuries of globalization. But the wider perspective is helpful. McKibben simply asks, *How big are we?*, and finds a complex answer that varies greatly over time. He reports efforts to calculate daily energy use of human beings and says that in hunter-gatherer times it was about 2,500 calories, all of it food. 2,500 calories is the equivalent of a common dolphin’s intake. A modern human, by contrast, uses 31,000 calories per day. That’s the intake of a pilot whale. And the average U.S. American uses six times that, which is what a sperm whale burns.⁵⁰ In other words, we have become “different from the people we used to be. Not kinder or unkind, not deeper or stupider—our natures seemed to have changed little since Homer. We’ve just gotten bigger. We appear to be the same species, with stomachs of the same size, but we aren’t. It’s

as if each of us were trailing a big Macy's-parade balloon around, feeding it constantly."⁵¹ The difference, of course, is in the *way* we live. When hunter-gatherers settled down and became farmers, a little extra land was set aside for support. Now not only a little cropland and little pasture is necessary for the meat and vegetables, but a little forest, a little mine, a little oil well.⁵² Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, scientists in Vancouver, have measured this altered "ecological footprint" and found that while the 1.7 million people of their stunning city live on a million acres, another 21.5 million acres of land support them—"wheat fields in Alberta, oil fields in Saudi Arabia, tomato fields in California."⁵³ People may appear much the same size, but on this end of the transformations of modernity they are a little like Alice when she ate the cake. They suddenly grow and the day arrives that the average U.S. American's intake is seventy-five times the hunter-gatherer's and she or he is vastly more dependent on resources around the world. While McKibben is right—the balloons above the heads can shrink or grow, depending on how people choose to live⁵⁴—the point is that development, and globalization generally, has chosen growth itself as the measure.

In brief, development has been an astounding success, as judged by its own heady criteria of rising production and consumption. Yet unprecedented "progress" has left in its wake both a crisis of nature and a crisis of social justice. The specter is not that of Eden, but of unsustainability. The Community of Life as a whole is in jeopardy.

Yet this is not the time to assess development overall. It is time to offer a conclusion: post-WWII development is both the second wave of globalization *and a continuation* of the

greatest upending of nature and culture together in history. Coupled with the neo-Europeanization of the planet, it defines much of the present moment. The Zapatistas, it turns out, are correct: the 500 years and the 40 belong together. Colonization, commerce, and development are different chapters of the same complex story.

• ***Post-1989 Free-Trade Capitalism.*** Globalization's third wave is post Cold War "free trade" liberalization. The gist of it is the totalizing effect of the market. The conviction of the second wave holds here, too, that economic development should be the organizing principle for all societies and peoples. But here, at the vaunted "end of history,"⁵⁵ globalization is not carried out by independent nation states so much as global economic powers mastering global markets through political-economic means. In any event, the market itself is less the place of plain economic exchange than the model of society itself. In that form it does what colonization and development also did—continue modernity's assault on intact local community. Like wave one and wave two of globalization, so post-1989 global capitalism slices away at people's "self-organizing, self-governing, and self-provisioning capacities" in the very places they live on the terms and with the resources indigenous to those places, peoples, and traditions.⁵⁶ (It is difficult to exaggerate how far we are here from Adam Smith's own preference of place-based economies consisting of small and locally-owned enterprises that engage the people in producing for the needs of the community and its members, economies supported by moral worlds that also assumed and sought to reproduce community on a human scale.)⁵⁷

But beyond this slicing away at self-

sustaining community there is present capitalism's deeper reach into, and transformation of, nature, to its fundamental building blocks themselves. And this is paralleled with a deeper reach into the psyche and human consciousness, into basic relationships and orienting values. Said differently, the chief characteristic of globalization's third wave is the extension and intensification of market society in a capitalist mode in such a way that the logic of the economy is taken to be the logic of society itself.⁵⁸ The commercialization of social relations—a whole way of life is lived and thought of in terms of “goods and services”—goes hand-in-hand with increased commodification. Knowledge, and not just material nature, to pick but one example, is rendered a commodity more and more. So a kind of enclosure of the intellectual commons takes place in which intellectual property rights are rendered private rights rather than common rights, and the site of debate is less nation-state negotiations than international trade talks pushed by corporate interests and their governmental allies. Media and advertising, to move on a different front, shape more and more of the images and values we internalize as more and more of cultural life—whether sports, the arts, entertainment, even education—is brought into the nexus of capital. In short, more and more everyday human relationships become “moneyed” in one way or another⁵⁹ and the personally-formative, socially-integrative, and culturally-reproductive functions of civil society's communities—families, neighborhoods, schools, faith communities, voluntary organizations of all kinds—are increasingly driven by the political economy and reflect its dynamics. Human character and conduct, not just other-than-human nature, are now shaped

by essentially economic values mediated by media and markets.

An article in *The New York Times*, entitled “Where Money's a Mantra Greed's a New Creed,” gives just a glimpse. The article tries to say how “money is woven into the fabric of daily life today in a way it never was in the past.” One item on the list “is the way marketing suffuses the culture from the toy-of-the-moment on Saturday-morning cartoons to the disparate images of seniors as either on-the-go consumers or near invalids.”⁶⁰ Another kind of glimpse is offered in Robert Kaplan's engrossing account of his trek across the U.S. and part of Mexico. He “has traveled to Omaha and seen the future.” Here it is: “Standardized corporate fortresses, privately guarded housing developments, Disneyfied tourist bubbles;” “isolated suburban pods and enclaves of races and classes unrelated to each other;” an automobile-oriented city where “you will be even less comfortable outside of your car in the future than you are now;” a business elite with its own foreign policy “dominated by the concerns of trade and *Realpolitik* rather than by human rights and spreading democracy;” a politically apathetic populace more interested in health clubs and the Internet than in community life; a society where the poor fend for themselves; and a “civilization influenced by the impersonal bottom-line values of the corporation.”⁶¹ And Omaha, it turns out, comes off rather well in a future in which “global materialism and the communications revolution promise the slow and subtle withering away of the traditional nation-state, the death of the traditional middle-class, a ‘wilderness’ of region-states and suburban oases linked to

a global marketplace and a new class of [cosmopolitans] loyal only to their own region but intellectually and professionally inhabiting a larger world.”⁶²

One of the important moral analyses of this world, Philip Selznick’s *The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community*, comes at this reality in this way:

“Whatever unity we may find is imposed, not natural or organic. History [in the current American ethos] is discarded as irrelevant; all is foreground, all surface, and multiple surfaces at that. Continuities of place and experience are lost forever in a world of homogeneous settings and replaceable modules. A ceaseless barrage of images and ‘sound bites’ undercuts the capacity to make sense of public and private life. Consumerism reigns, and with it a transformation of things properly valued for themselves into fungible commodities....Because the worlds we inhabit are products of human artifice, they are arbitrary ‘all the way down’.”⁶³

But the U.S. is only part of a planet-spanning dynamic. Human and non-human nature elsewhere is also increasingly colonized by capital. Two-Thirds World agriculture, not only First World agriculture, is drawn into the orbit of huge agribusiness firms. Farmers of “the South” may in fact now be losing to commercial capitalism and governmental allies the right to produce and use their own seeds. If Hans Leenders, former Secretary General of the International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of Plant Varieties, signals the future, farmers most

certainly will not be allowed to save seed.

Even though it has been a tradition in most countries that a farmer can save seed from his own crop, it is under the changing circumstances not equitable that farmers can use this seed and grow a commercial crop out of it without payment of a royalty; the seed industry will have to fight hard for a better kind of protection.⁶⁴

Too, life-forms everywhere are more and more the organic plastic of engineering and patents as rights *to* nature are favored over the rights *of* nature, if the latter get a hearing at all. And biodiversity, that precious source of all future possibilities, is under planetary assault—by bioprospecting, biotechnology, the spread of global monoculture, mass production and consumption, not to mention the species and habitat destruction of expanding economies.

Not least should it be noted that huge flows of financial capital—\$1.4 trillion per day now—change hands in global financial markets in the pursuit of, not development or any real exchange of goods and services, but speculative profits.⁶⁵

In short, the vertical reach of global free trade capitalism into nature, psyche and society matches an intensified, extended horizontal one. Global free trade capitalism is a worthy successor to colonization and development.

“Arbitrary ‘all the way down’,” to recall Selznick, is the outcome of this comprehensive commodification of life. Life becomes an ensemble of human constructs, and they can always be rendered differently. Thus the endpoint of the Bull of Donation, applied centuries later to DNA and body parts as well as lands and seeds, is the colonization

of life itself. To be sure, it is no longer the logic of feudalism and monarchy that reigns, nor early forms of the new economy of the bourgeoisie, but the logic of entrepreneur, engineer, speculator, and spin doctor as purveyors of post-1989 capitalism. Nonetheless, a great continuity persists. All three waves simultaneously transform nature and society together (they are, after all, utterly inseparable) in historically unprecedented ways. And all three waves fail, despite their heady and genuine achievements, to address satisfactorily the social question and the ecological question (they, too, are utterly inseparable).

Ecclesial Work

Given these three waves, the task of addressing the social question (social justice) and the ecological question (sustainability) simultaneously requires far-reaching changes. Such changes will, if they happen, echo across the Community of Life as a whole and will entail material, conceptual, moral, and spiritual dimensions. The purpose of such changes would be to move us from a presently unsustainable Earth to a sustainable one and will of necessity include any number of transitions. For the moment seven can be named, despite the fact the foregoing discussion has not prepared the case equally for all of them. They are: an *economic* transition that lives off nature's "income" instead of "capital" and builds into all economic activity, including the cost of goods, that which is required for nature's regeneration and renewal indefinitely; a *social* transition to a far broader sharing of nature's income and human wealth, together with increased opportunities for sustaining and sustainable

livelihoods for all; an *institutional* transition that combines greater cross-national cooperation in order to address global problems with greater attention to what makes for sustainable local and regional communities; an *informational* transition in which research, education, and global exchange allow large numbers of people to understand the problems they face and offer them the means to address these problems; a *demographic* transition from an unprecedented population explosion to a roughly stable world population; a *technological* transition which effectively means minimal environmental impact per person; a *moral* transition to a framework that includes the societal, the biophysical, and the geoplanetary—the whole Community of Life—as the arena of responsibility and undertakes spiritual-moral formation commensurate with that; and a *religious* transition to earthkeeping as a religious calling and vocation common to all the world's religions.⁶⁶

And what about the churches? What best prepares them for their own participation in these transitions, given their past participation in the history of globalization?

While answers to these questions are part of a much larger endeavor, tentatively titled "Song of Songs: Ecumenical Christianities as Earth Faiths,"⁶⁷ at least the following can be offered. It is essentially a way of leaning into the world now on the part of Christian communities and on the part of theological education itself.

Necessary, first, is to note the role of dominant forms of Euro-American Christianity and then offer an approach that runs in another direction. Much good historical work has been done so we need not go to great lengths to repeat the fact that few

voices in dominating North Atlantic Christianities have been raised against the global political expansion that represented the greatest demographic change and land transfer and transformation in the history of the world (European emigration and the settling of neo-Europes around the world). Nor have many voices been raised against economic domination in the form of globalizing industrialism as led by capitalism. It is probably necessary to reiterate, but not spell out, that Protestant churches in particular, together with Anglicanism, have been closely aligned with the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 18th century and have helped maintain the hegemony of that class (and of white supremacy) in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most important now, however, is to undertake a specific turn; namely, a turn from the fallacy of Christianity as a European religion, and neo-European civilization as Christian, to the multiple histories of Christianities whose experience of modernity is not one of strong alliance and tepid critique, yet whose experience includes the impact of globalization. This means, both for theological education and ecumenical church linkages at every level, contact with those Christian communities of Africa and Asia (Coptic churches or the Mar Thoma Church, for example) who address Earth issues from traditions that do not belong to European/American cultural history. It means learning from communities of indigenous-based Christianity who may have been the target of Euro-American missionary activity but whose Christianity has come to tap other, native roots (The Association of African Earthkeeping Churches in Zimbabwe, for example, a network of African Initiated Churches). It

means learning from communities that have multiple cultural and historical roots that include both Euro-American influences and local, indigenous histories (The Khanya Programme of the Methodist Church in Kwazulu/Natal, South Africa is one example; the Orthodox Church in Alaska is another). To these it is critical to add dissenting communities of the North Atlantic, communities that are challenging dominant Christianities through a selective use of traditions in the cause of renewal, renewal that adds up to Christianity as an "Earth faith" (The Iona Community in Scotland is one example, any number of African-American churches engaged in community organizing work is another). Through such an account of multiple Christianities we can begin to expose the viability and richness of Christian traditions and identities in the modern/postmodern world for deeply-rooted contributions to Earth community and an Earth ethic comprehensive of the joined social and ecological questions.

There are no pristine traditions, however, and the search is not for the one right practice of Christianity. It is for multiple Christianities with multiple practices, all of which test their fidelity to God by their contribution to the Community of Life as a whole. Yet this itself requires rethinking, together with reconsidered and renewed practices. Differently said, there is likely the need for conversion of our traditions themselves, our conceptual traditions included.

And what might the nature of that be? While it, too, will necessarily be many-faceted, a provocative suggestion for theological education is offered by Juergen Moltmann. With that, and the unfinished agenda, we bring this paper to a close.

Looking back on his long career as a theologian, Moltmann reconsidered it all, only to conclude: “If I could start all over again, I would link my theology with ecological economics. The last two centuries were dominated by economic questions; the next century will be the age of ecology, in which the organism of the earth will become the all-determining factor and will have to be taken into consideration by everyone.”⁶⁸

This is another way of saying what was asserted by way of the globalization narrative: the crucial issues before us lie at the intersection of The Big Economy (the global human economy) and the Great Economy (the economy of nature). But Moltmann’s specific point is that the dialogue partner for theology shifts from philosophy and the social sciences to ecological economics. Moltmann’s point, put differently, is that theology must turn to thinking within a framework “in which the organism of the earth will become the all-determining factor.” Just finding the categories to do so entails a theological reimagining that can only be compared with the conceptional work of great reformations! Here is the paradigm shift asked for but not yet accomplished: How do we do all our theological reflection from earth-centered praxis, with “Earth” encompassing the human economy and the economy of (the rest of) nature together? How do we shift in our understanding and articulation of faith from anthropocentric and androcentric categories and habits to biocentric and geocentric frames? How do we articulate Christian vocation as quite simply fidelity to earth, and measure all our religious and moral impulses by the criterion of their contribution to Earth’s care and well-being? (With “Earth” again understood as comprehensive of nature and society together as a single, complex community full of life but “under house

arrest,” to recall the word of Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the 1992 Earth Summit.)

The Plowshares Institute report, *Changing The Way Seminaries Teach: Globalization and Theological Education*, is not sanguine about this shift. The report is restricted to the study of twelve North American seminaries that participated in the Globalization of Theological Education program over five years in the early 1990s. The research conclusions, nonetheless, likely pertain to far more institutions than this slender dozen. One conclusion is that in a time when “multi-national, corporate capitalism” is “one, if not *the*, major causal force behind global interdependence,” North American seminary education has given “little theological attention...to economics in general and global capitalism in particular.”⁶⁹ Furthermore, attention to ecological issues does not warrant notice at all, much less the huge agenda that sits where the globalizing economy and planetary life systems rub raw against one another. The report documents in detail the need for a new “conceptual space” for theological education and argues for it. Yet “the organism of earth” as the “all-determining factor” is not conceived *as* that conceptual space in the report. It is still missing in action as the framework within which the theological enterprise does what it does with and for people of faith.

In summary, the ecclesial work at hand is to investigate those trajectories of Christian faith that have suffered more than benefited from the forces that forged modernity and to take up the constructive task from vantage points along these trajectories. The constructive task itself, however, is best engaged within a framework that conceives “the organism of earth” as the “all-determining factor.” The task is multiple Christianities as genuine Earth faiths.

- ¹ The lengthy section of this paper on globalization is part of a chapter scheduled for publication in *Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans*, edited by Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming). The chapter there is entitled "Global Ecojustice: The Church's Mission in Urban Society."
- ² Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 211.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 211.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 211.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 212.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 212.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 212.
- ⁸ Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2: 1010.
- ⁹ "Capitalism" was a term given by European philosophers three-quarters of a century later, in the mid-1800s. They intended by it to describe an economic system whereby the benefits of productive assets are monopolized by a few—the "capitalists"—to the exclusion of the many. The many, however, supply the labor which rendered those assets productive. The history of capitalism, including capitalism and the philosophers, is available from many sources. Classics include Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation: Origins of Our Time* (London: Gollanez Publishing, 1945) and Robert Heilbroner's *The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953; 6th edition, 1986). An engaging recent account is David Korten's *The Post-Corporate World: Life After Capitalism* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers and Kumarian Press, 1999).
- ¹⁰ Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), 23.
- ¹¹ As cited and described by Vandana Shiva in *Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge* (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 1997), 1.
- ¹² Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 2.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ¹⁴ Caucasian peoples, whether in Europe or the neo-European settlements around the globe, have rarely taken this fully into account. For a sense of this, albeit limited to native peoples of the Americas and not inclusive of the African diaspora, see Jack Weatherford's *Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the World* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988).
- ¹⁵ Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 302-5.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 303.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 131.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 193-94.
- ²¹ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (New York: The Modern Library, 1994), 675. Smith goes on to say: "By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's wants, to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned...they [the Europeans] were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries" (pp. 675-676). "In consequence of the representation of Columbus, the council of Castile determined to take possession of countries of which the inhabitants were plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting them to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of finding treasures of gold there, was the sole motive which prompted to undertake it" (p. 605).
- ²² Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism*, frontispiece. I have taken portions of this discussion of the epigraphs from my chapter, "Sweet Betsy and Her Avalanche," in *Earth Community, Earth Ethics* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1996), 38-40.
- ²³ Cited by Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva in *Ecofeminism* (London: Zed Books, 1993), 32.
- ²⁴ See Sallie McFague, *Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 67-69.

- ²⁵ Boyle's Law states that the pressure and volume of a gas are inversely proportional to one another and is one of the key "gas laws" in physics.
- ²⁶ Boyle is cited by Shiva in *Biopiracy*, 105-6.
- ²⁷ Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 106.
- ²⁸ It is true Darwin doesn't think Europeans necessarily represent the epitome of civilization. Caucasians may themselves be superseded at some future point in the evolutionary drama. Then, he says, the gap between "man and his nearest allies" ("the anthropomorphous apes") will be even wider. It will not fall, as it does now, "between the negro or Australian [aborigine] and the gorilla," with Caucasians above all these, but between more civilized successors to Caucasians and the apes. The quotations here and in the text above are from Darwin's *The Descent of Man* as cited by Marilynne Robinson, *The Death of Adam* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 34-35.
- ²⁹ John Winthrop, "Life and Letters," quoted in Djelal Kadir, *Columbus and the Ends of the Earth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 171.
- ³⁰ Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 12.
- ³¹ Cited from Wolfgang Sachs, "The Political Anatomy of 'Sustainable Development'," *Wuppertal Papers*, no. 35 (May 1995): 23. The translation is Sachs'.
- ³² Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 104.
- ³³ See the discussion in Rasmussen, *Earth Community, Earth Ethics*, 31-34 but also 75-77.
- ³⁴ Gustavo Esteva, "Basta!" *The Ecologist* 24: 3 (May/June 1994):83.
- ³⁵ I draw here from Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 107.
- ³⁶ Cited by J. Ronald Engel, "Sustainable Development: A New Global Ethic?" in *The Egg: An Eco-Justice Quarterly* 12: 1 (Winter 1991-92): 5. Emphasis mine.
- ³⁷ Cited by Engel, "Sustainable Development," 5.
- ³⁸ Wolfgang Sachs as cited by Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, *Redeeming the Creation, the Rio Earth Summit: Challenge to the Churches* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1992), 1.
- ³⁹ Wolfgang Sachs, "Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development," in *Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict*, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1993), 4- 5.
- ⁴⁰ Much of this discussion is taken from my *Earth Community, Earth Ethics*, 134-137.
- ⁴¹ Sachs, "The Political Anatomy of 'Sustainable Development'," 7.
- ⁴² I draw on the discussion of Ulrich Duchrow, *Europe in the World System 1492-1992* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1992), 36-37.
- ⁴³ Cited by Robert Kuttner in his review, "Running with the Bulls," of Edward Luttwak, *Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*. Kuttner's review in *The New York Times Book Review*, 28 February 1999: 20.
- ⁴⁴ Both quotations are cited by Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, *Redeeming the Creation, the Rio Earth Summit: Challenge to the Churches* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1992), 6-7.
- ⁴⁵ Sachs, "The Political Anatomy of 'Sustainable Development'," 7.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁴⁷ This was provided by the Summit's blue-ribbon commission report, popularly known as the Brundtland Commission Report.
- ⁴⁸ Sachs, "The Political Anatomy of 'Sustainable Development'," 7-8.
- ⁴⁹ Alan T. Durning, *How Much Is Enough?* (London: Earthscan, 1992), 38.
- ⁵⁰ Bill McKibben, "A Special Moment in History," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1998: 56-57.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁵³ This is McKibben's reference, p. 57 of "A Special Moment in History." For a full account see Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on Earth* (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1996).
- ⁵⁴ McKibben, "A Special Moment in History," 57.
- ⁵⁵ The reference is to Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992) in which Fukuyama argues that ideological struggles are over and what remains is for the world to adjust to liberal capitalist modernity as the shape of permanent arrangements.

- ⁵⁶ Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 115. The Harare Assembly of the World Council of Churches included a presentation by Musa W. Dube Shomanah, "Fifty Years of Bleeding: A Storytelling Feminist Reading of Mark 5:24-43." Dr. Shomanah includes the history of Africa, who is portrayed as Mama Africa. The history parallels our discussion above and makes Shiva's point. Shomanah says: "Mama Africa made her last bet—taking the prescriptions of Dr. Global Village. Mama Africa also saw with her eyes the arrival of chain stores and companies in her land. Suddenly, there was Coca-Cola and Pepsi, Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's and Wimpy's, BP, Hyundai, CNN. The colours were the same everywhere. They brought the touch of foreign sophistication. When the multinational companies came, bringing jobs for Africa, the local companies were bought out. Mama Africa and all her people began to work for the big multinational companies. But soon after, high-tech machines rolled in, replacing her children. They were retrenched, asked to go home to their cramped lands. That is when Mama Africa realized that Dr. Global Village was a twin brother of Dr. Neo-Colonialism and a grandson of Dr. Colonial Master. . ." *The Ecumenical Review* 51:1 (January 1999): 16.
- ⁵⁷ The discussion is from David Korten, "The Post-Corporate World," *Yes! A Journal of Positive Futures*, no. 9 (Spring 1999): 17.
- ⁵⁸ "In a capitalist mode" is a necessary modifier. Markets do not define capitalism, despite the common use of "capitalism" and "a market society" as synonyms. Markets in some form are a part of every economic order.
- ⁵⁹ This draws from the discussion of Elizabeth Bounds, *Coming Together, Coming Apart: Religion, Community, and Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 35-36, and from my *Moral Fragments and Moral Community* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
- ⁶⁰ "Where Money's a Mantra Greed's the New Creed," *The New York Times*, 28 February 1999, News of the Week in Review.
- ⁶¹ This is reviewer Thurston Clarke's summary in "The Wasteland," *New York Times Book Review*, 6 September 1998: 4. His citations are taken from pages 56-76 of Robert Kaplan's *An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future* (New York: Random House, 1998).
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 4.
- ⁶³ Philip Selznick, *The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 13.
- ⁶⁴ Hans Leenders, "Reflections on 25 Years of Service to the International Seed Trade Federation," *Seedsmen's Digest* 37:5, p. 89, as cited by Shiva, *Biopiracy*, 53.
- ⁶⁵ David Korten, "The War Against Markets, Democracy, People and Nature," in *A World That Works: Building Blocks for a Just and Sustainable Society*, ed. Trent Shroyer (New York: The Bootstrap Press, 1997), 232.
- ⁶⁶ An adaptation from the discussion in M. Mitchell Waldorp, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 350-51.
- ⁶⁷ This is a research and writing project currently being undertaken by the author of this paper with the assistance of students at Union Theological Seminary, New York City.
- ⁶⁸ Juergen Moltmann, "The Adventure of Theological Ideas," as cited in M. Douglas Meeks, "Juergen Moltmann's *Systematic Contributions to Theology*," *Religious Studies Review* 22:2 (April 1996): 105.
- ⁶⁹ David A. Roozen, Alice Frazier Evans, and Robert A. Evans, *Changing the Way Seminaries Teach: Globalization and Theological Education* (Hartford, CT: Hartford Seminary Center for Social and Religious Research, 1966), 189-90.